INTERNATIONALHUMANRIGHTSLAWANDCONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS:INFAVOUROFSYNERGY
human rights law is mythologized as a top-down, 'un-American', and anti-democratic enterprise. 4 The first step for anyone concerned with highlighting the potential for international human rightslawtoplayavaluableroleinrights-relatedlitigationintheUnitedStatesisto'myth-bust' inbothdirections.InthisarticleIintendtoarguethatinfactUnitedStatesconstitutionalcivil rightslawandinternationalhumanrightslawshareacommoncoreofvaluesandpurposesthat make them the ideal theatre in which synergistic and catalytic interaction between domestic andinternationallawcantakeplace.Thisis,indeed,thetypeofrelationshipbetweendomestic andinternationallawthatisforeseenandintendedbyinternationalhumanrightslawandhas happened in other jurisdictions and contexts, such as in relation to LGBT rights in (Western) Europe. I do not intend to argue that international human rights law is binding in domestic law. The statusofinternationalhumanrightslawindomesticlegalsystemsisamatterforthosesystems themselves. Under US constitutional law international human rights law is part of federal common law inasmuch as it is customary international law and reliant on incorporation inasmuchasitiscontainedinnon-self-executingtreatiesratifiedbytheUnitedStateswiththe advice and consent of the Senate. The argument made out here does not seek to challenge that.Rather,thisarticlearguesthatinternationalhumanrightslawisanappropriatesourceof persuasive authority that ought to be pleaded in cases of constitutional rights interpretation. Thismightensurethat,totheextentpossiblewithinthetextandstructureoftheConstitution itself,rightsaffordedconstitutionalprotectionareharmoniouswithinternationalhumanrights law in terms of content and scope. International human rights law, then, is presented as an interpretiveaidindomesticrightsinterpretation,applicationandenforcement. Thefirstpartofthisarticleexpandsontheappropriaterelationshipbetweeninternationaland domestic rights law and argues that it is one of synergy rather than one of superiority or inferiority.Farfromthemyriadadjudicatorybodiesthathaveappearedininternationalhuman rights law representing some kind of strong-arm measures by international law, their admissibilityrulesinparticularshowthatthedesiredstateofaffairsisoneinwhichrightsare effectively protected in the domestic sphere without any recourse to the international legal machinery. The article then goes on to illustrate the type of synergistic relationship that is possiblebetweendomesticandinternationalrights-protectinglawbymeansoftheexampleof (1996-97)(notingthe"anti-internationalattitudewhichseemsprevalentin[theUnitedStates]inthe1990s"at 636).
LGBTrightsinEurope.InseveraldifferentareasofLGBTrightsactivismandadvocacy,litigants found it necessary to bring their cases to the European Court of Human Rights, 5 based in Strasbourg.Thesecaseswerebroughtforthepurposesofresolvingwhetherdomesticlaws,by which sexual and gender minorities were differentially treated, were permissible under the European Convention on Human Rights. 6 What is important about these cases, from the perspective of this article, is that they frequently involved the Court in using synergistic decision-making processes such as 'European consensus' in adjudicating on the complaints beforethem.
Having established the possibility of a synergistic relationship between international and domestic human rights law in the second part of the article and the desirability and appropriatenessofsucharelationshipinthefirstpart,thethirdpartofthisarticlegoesonto considerwhethersucharelationshipispossibleorappropriateintheUnitedStatesgiventhe constitutionalpositionofinternationallaw.InthisPart,Iarguethatalthoughtherearesome prima facie structural impediments to the use of international human rights law in constitutional rights adjudication, these impediments are not insurmountable. However, successfullyovercomingthemrequiresaparticularattitudinalapproachtointernationalhuman rightslawthatmayrequireacculturation. Legal interference (i.e. the interference has the quality of law and was introduced throughlegalmeasures); 2.
II.SYNERGYORSUPERIORITY
Necessity (i.e. the interference was necessary for the purposes of one of the heads included in Article 8.2 -national security, public safety, national well-being, public order, the protectionofhealthandmoralsandtheprotectionoftherightsandfreedomsofothers); 3.
Proportionality(i.e.themeasurestakeninordertosecureoneoftheheadsincludedin Article8.2wereproportionateinasmuchastheyaredirectedtowardsthatnecessityanddonot overlyinfringeontherightsofindividuals) The jurisprudence on LGBT rights and Article 8 is important from this perspective because it illustrates the capacity for domestic and international rights law to have a synergistic relationship. As will be illustrated in the brief survey of some relevant jurisprudence that follows, the European Court of Human Rights has afforded states a margin of appreciation in relation to LGBT rights where appropriate but, once it has identified a tipping point by referenceinparticulartothelegalandsocialconditionsinnationstates,ithasnarrowedthat margin of appreciation to naught thereby requiring member states to amend their domestic law in line with the Court's interpretation of the Convention or risk being in breach of their internationalobligations. Thefirst'battleground'inLGBTrightslitigationundertheEuropeanConventionwastherightto privacy and criminalisation of homosexuality. It has long been clear that 'privacy' as defined withinArticle8coversanindividual'sphysicalandmoralintegrity,includingone'ssexuallife. 21 ThefirstmajorcaseinthisrelationwasDudgeonvUnitedKingdom.
22 Dudgeonclaimedthatthe criminalisationofconsensualanalsexinNorthernIrelandinfringedonhisrighttoprivacyasa homosexual man, whereas the United Kingdom claimed that it had a large margin of appreciation (i.e. discretion) in situations where the protection of morals were concerned. Furthermore the UK submitted that the majority of people in Northern Ireland found male homosexuality morally unacceptable and feared that repealing this law would lead to deteriorationinmoralstandards.OnthatbasistheUKclaimedthatmaintainingcriminalisation forsuchactswasnecessary,proportionateandwithintheirrights. Whileacceptingthatmemberstatesdidhaveabroadmarginofappreciationinissuesofpublic morality the Court held that "[a]s compared with the era when that legislation was enacted, thereisnowabetterunderstanding,andinconsequenceanincreasedtolerance,ofconsensual homosexual behaviour to the extent that in the great majority of the member States of the CouncilofEuropeitisnolongerconsideredtobenecessaryorappropriatetotreathomosexual practicesofthekindnowinquestion"ascriminal. 23 InadditiontheCourtheldthatevenifan argumentcouldbemadeinfavourofsuchlegislationthedetrimentaleffectsitwouldhaveon people'scapacitiestochoosehowtheylivedtheirlivesoutweighedanysuchconsiderations.As aresultthelegislationwasdeemedinconsistentwithArticle8and,subsequently,repealedby theUKgovernment. One of only four dissenting judgments in Dudgeon was that of (Irish judge) Justice Walsh, whose judgment concentrated on whether the law had any business delving into issues of personalmoralityatall. 40 SignificantlytheCourtheldthatalthoughtherewerepreviouscasesfromtheCommissionthat alloweddifferentialagesofconsenttheConventionitselfwas"alivinginstrument,whichhasto be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions." 41 Given the fact that most Convention member states had equalized their ages of consent, a differential age of consent must be capableofobjectiveandreasonablejustificationinordertoavoidviolatingtheConvention.The criminalization of the complainant on the basis of differential ages of consent was therefore foundtobeinviolationofArticle8. TheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights hasalsoestablishedthattherighttoprivacyincludesa righttoidentity.ThemainissuefacedbytheCourt,however,hasbeentheextenttowhicha Stateisobligedtorecogniseone'sidentity,particularlywheresomeonehasundergonegender realignment surgery. Most of the cases taken in relation to identity and privacy concern the birth certificate and whether or not a state is required to put in place a mechanism for amendment of the birth certificate following gender realignment. In France the applicant was strictly confined in terms of choice of name and gender was encoded in a personal identity number which was required for a variety of interactions with government and private entities. As a result of this, and because the sophisticated French system of recording personal identity wouldrequireonlyminorchanges,theCourtfoundthatFrancewasrequiredtorecognisethe applicant's gender. Interestingly, this decision was not based on the state's margin of appreciation or on changes in common consensus; rather it was based on the specific circumstanceswithinFranceandimplicationsfortheapplicant.Bwasnot,therefore,inconflict withtheearlierdecisionsinRees,CosseyandSheffield. ItwasnotuntilGoodwinvUnitedKingdom 47 thattheStrasbourgcourtsubstantiallychangedits stanceinthisrelation.ChristineGoodwinwasapost-operativemale-to-femaletranssexualwho sought, inter alia, to have her birth certificate amended to reflect her realigned gender. Goodwin noted particularly that the UK government had failed to take appropriate steps to respectheridentitydespitetheCourt'sadviceinpreviouscasestokeepthelawunderreview and in line with changes in comparative law. She stressed the rapid changes in scientific understandingofandsocialattitudestowardstranssexualsandcomplainedthatthesewerenot matched by legal reform. In particular she stressed the various laws that disadvantaged 44 [1990]ECHR21 transsexuals who could not amend their birth certificate and the significant distress and hurt caused in one's every day life as a result of such laws and social conditions. The respondent governmentsubmittedthatastherewasnogenerallyagreedoracceptedapproachamongthe memberstatesinrelationtotranssexualstheUKenjoyedawidemarginofappreciationinthis matteranddidnotviolateArticle8. In its assessment of the merits the Strasbourg Court held that in order to be effective the Convention must have regard to the changing conditions within individual states and the membersstatesgenerallyand,asaresult,thatitwasnotstrictlyboundtofollowthejudgments startingwithRees.TheCourtparticularlyfoundthattherewasaninconsistencyinEnglishlaw wherebygenderrealignmentsurgerycouldbecarriedoutbytheNationalHealthService,which thereforerecognisestranssexualism,butontheotherhandthisrealignedgenderwasnotfully recognisedbythestate.TheCourtnotedsignificantgrowthinknowledgeandunderstandingof transsexualism and held that there was no scientific argument against legal recognition of realigned gender. The Court found that only four member states (including the United Kingdom) had no mechanism of legal recognition following gender realignment and was influencedbytheemerginginternationalconsensusonthisissue.Allofthiscombinedindicated that an international legal, social, scientific, psychological and medical consensus on transsexualismwasemerging.Givenalloftheabove,andgiventheexistenceofanumberof law reform proposals for legal recognition within the UK itself, the Court held that there had beenareductioninthestate'smarginofappreciationand,asaresult,aviolationofChristine Goodwin'sArticle8rights. ThisshortandselectivesurveyoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights'approachtoLGBTrights illustrates the type of synergistic relationship that is possible between international and domestichumanrightslaw.Whereappropriate,theCourtusedthemarginofappreciationto allowstatessomediscretioninhowtoapproachLGBTrightsbutwhereatippingpointcouldbe identified-based largely on emergent practice in other states-the Court issued clear interpretationsofthecontentandscopeoftherighttoprivacyasitrelatedtoLGBTrightsand dramaticallyreducedthemarginofappreciation.Themarginofappreciationisakeyconcept within ECHR law and gives states discretion in questions of particular sensitivity. Importantly, however,themarginofappreciationdoesnotconstituteacarteblancheforstatestodoasthey wish.Asaconsensusemerges,particularlyonissuesofsensitivityorissuesinrelationtowhich the law may be in a transitional stage, the margin will become narrower until it is no longer acceptableforastatetooperateinamannerinconsistentwiththeconventionrightsasgiven effectbycommonEuropeanpractice.Themarginofappreciationthereforedecreasesinsizeas consensusincreases.Bycorollary,asthemargindecreasestheobligationonstatestoamend theirdomesticlawtorecognisechangingconsensusincreasesevenbeforeadejureobligation arises through a bright-line judgment of the Court clarifying that a Convention provision can nowbesaidtoprotectcertainbehavioursundertherubricofprivacy.Inaddition,thenarrower themarginandgreatertheconsensusthemoreweightythejurisprudenceoftheCourtcanbe asaninterpretiveaidindomesticproceedingswhereanalogousquestions-astowhether,for example,constitutionalprivacyrightsincludearighttohaveone'srealignedgenderrecognised inlaw-areatbar. writtenelsewhere,dualismandanti-internationalismarenotnecessarybedfellows. 53 Infact,I argue that among dualist jurisdictions there is a spectrum of internationalisation relating to unincorporated international law. 54 Thus, in some dualist states judges in the superior courts are quite willing to have recourse to international human rights law in the course of constitutional interpretation-this is quite evident in South Africa where the Constitution expressly calls for such attention to be paid to international human rights law, 55 but such an expressreferenceisnotrequired.TheUnitedStatesConstitutionprovidesforneitherastrictly dualist nor a strictly monist system of dealing with international law. The Supremacy Clause provides for customary international law to be federal common law 56 and jurisprudential developmenthasresultedinwhatareknownasself-executingtreatiesbeingconsideredselfincorporating and non-self-executing treaties requiring express incorporation.
IV:INTERNATIONALHUMANRIGHTSLAWANDUSCONSTITUTIONALLAW
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Incorporation ofnon-self-executingtreatiesmakesthosetreatiesbindingindomesticlaw.This,ofcourse,is relevant where one is attempting to assert a treaty-based right in domestic proceedings. However, the kind of synergistic relationship between international human rights law and domestic constitutional law envisaged by this author does not hinge on whether a piece of internationallawisbindingdomesticallyornot.Infact,itdoesnotevenhingeonwhetherthe UnitedStateshasratifiedtheparticularpieceofinternationallaw.Itis,rather,concernedwith the idea that international human rights law can and should be seen as a persuasive body of lawrelevanttoconstitutionalinterpretationofcivilrights,particularlyinrelationtothecontent andscopeofthosecivilrightsincontemporarycircumstances.WhenKennedyJ.,forexample, referred to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in Roper v Simmons 58 he was not claimingthattheConventionwasinternationallybindingontheUnitedStates(itisnotasthe US has not ratified it). Neither was he asserting the domestic justiciability of the Convention. Rather, Kennedy J. was using the Convention and the standards set down within it as a benchmarkfortheappropriatescopeofchildren'srightsinrelationtopunishment,whichthen 59 The difference is, perhaps, that when making their decisionsconstitutionalcourtsdonotpurporttobemakinguniversallyapplicablelawtowhich other states are to be measured and, to some extent, international human rights law adjudicatory bodies might be said to. But those international bodies are making universally applicablelawintheinternationalsphere. As a matter of international law a state may be obliged to ensure that its law and practice adherestocertainrights-basedstandards.Theclaimisnotthatthisisthecaseasamatterof domestic law although, in practical terms, domestic law is likely to be examined for its compatibility with those international standards by those international bodies. Those internationalbodiesare,however,assessingcompatibilitywithinternationallawandnotwith domesticconstitutionallaw.Intheprocessofconstitutionalinterpretation,domesticsuperior courts such as the United States Supreme Court are(generally)assessingthecompatibility of law or governmental action with domestic law unless international standards are said to be binding. A truly synergistic relationship between domestic and international human and civil rightslawwouldseecourts-whereapplicable-consideringwhetherthescopeandcontentof constitutional rights against which governmental action is measured can and should be interpreted by reference to international human rights law (as well as other comparative sources).
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Thisisnottosaythatallacademicsorjudgesapproveoftheuseofcomparativeconstitutionallawindomestic constitutionallitigation;theydonot.However,thisisnotbecauseofanyclaimthatcomparativeconstitutionallaw insome'trumps'orissuperiortodomesticconstitutionallaw.
V.CONCLUSION
Moving the discourse away from questions of superiority or inferiority of international and domestic human rights law in domestic litigation allows us to refocus debates on the appropriate use of international human rights law in domestic proceedings. This refocusing reminds us that, when used as an aid to constitutional interpretation, international human rightslawcandevelopasynergywithdomesticrightslaw(whethertermed'humanrights'or 'civil rights' law) that enables the upwards harmonisation of these bodies of law so that domestic law protects individual rights effectively. International human rights laws' various adjudicatory bodies-such as regional courts and treaty-based committees-produce jurisprudencethatcanbeparticularlyusefulininterpretingthescopeandcontentofrightsina contemporary and effective manner, taking into account developments in a range of states. ThisjurisprudenceoffersanobviouspersuasivevaluetotheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtwhen it is grappling with analogous questions to those international institutions, albeit in domestic contexts. Thisisnottosuggestthattheseinternationalcourts'andcommittees'decisionsarebindingon theUnitedStates:unlesstheUShasacceptedtheirjurisdictionsthentheyarenot,eitherasa matterofinternationalordomesticlaw.However,non-bindingdecisionscanofferguidanceto superior courts in all jurisdictions. Where the basic value underlying the rights protecting provisionsintheinternationalanddomesticsphereisanalogousandessentiallydignitary,the persuasivevalueofthisinternationaljurisprudenceappearstobeallthemoreobvious.Courts all over the world-both domestic and international-are constantly struggling with how to ensurethattheirbasictextsarefitforpurposewhilenotmutilatingtheirmeaningbeyondclear literal and teleological grounds. Inter-institutional and inter-jurisdictional learning is both sensiblefromacommonsenseperspectiveandproductivefromtheperspectiveofcatalysing upwards harmonisation of rights protection. This has, as illustrated in Part II, happened and worked in the context of LGBT rights in the Council of Europe and, as argued in Part III, the structuraldifferencesbetweenEuropeandtheUnitedStatesarenotsoimmenseastomakea similar process impossible and inappropriate in relation to the US Constitution. Writing to SamuelKerchevalin1816,ThomasJeffersonstated: Somemenlookatconstitutionswithsanctimoniousreverenceanddeemthemlikethearkof the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdommorethanhumanandsupposewhattheydidtobebeyondamendment.Iknewthat agewell;Ibelongedtoitandlaboredwithit.Itdeservedwellofitscountry.Itwasverylikethe presentbutwithouttheexperienceofthepresent;andfortyyearsofexperienceingovernment isworthacenturyofbook-reading;andthistheywouldsaythemselvesweretheytorisefrom thedead. Itseemsdifficulttodisagreewiththesentiment.Learningfromexperience-whetherourown or that of others-and ensuring the contemporaneousness of the fundamental guarantees of the Constitution, without eroding their substance and dignitary foundation, are naturally collative processes. International human rights law is another source that can and should be 22CLPERESEARCHPAPERSERIES[VOL. 06NO.03 reached for in the process of interpreting domestic constitutional guarantees in the United Statesand,indeed,elsewhere.
